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Abstract
On November 8, 2016, the Indian government made a surprise announcement that certain
currency notes (representing 86% of the currency then in circulation) would no longer be
legal tender (although they could be deposited in banks over a limited period). The stated
reason for this sudden “demonetization” was to combat tax evasion and corruption
associated with “unaccounted-for” cash. We compute abnormal returns for firms on the
Indian stock market around this event, and compare patterns of abnormal returns for
different subsamples of firms defined by industry, ownership structure, and other
characteristics. There is little evidence that sectors thought to be associated with greater
tax evasion or corruption experienced significantly different returns. However, we find
substantial positive returns for banks and for state owned enterprises (SOEs), implying
market expectations that are puzzling in some respects, especially as the initial reactions
do not show any evidence of reversal in the five months following the event. The bank
results appear to indicate a market expectation of a persistent increase in financial depth.
We also find a pattern of higher returns for industries that are characterized by a greater
dependence on external finance, possibly suggesting an expectation of an easing of
financial constraints. The returns for SOEs may be due to possible indirect effects of the
announcement on perceptions of future corruption among these firms.
Keywords: Corruption; Tax evasion; Demonetization; India
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1) Introduction
Corruption and tax evasion are central themes in the study of development,
having occupied the attention of countless scholarly articles, news stories, development
agency mandates and legislative agendas. 1 On November 8, 2016, what was billed as a
new weapon in the anti-corruption arsenal was unveiled. The Prime Minister of India,
Narendra Modi, gave a surprise address to the nation to announce that from midnight the
500 and 1000 Indian Rupee (INR) notes would no longer be legal tender. 2 He said this
was being done to address concerns with “unaccounted for” cash used for corrupt
payments and tax evasion. The scale of this announcement is quite staggering – these
notes represented roughly 86% of the value of currency in circulation in India, an
economy in which it is estimated that over 90% of transactions are conducted in cash. 3
Holders of these notes were allowed to deposit them at banks and post offices until
December 30, 2016, subject to certain restrictions. For instance, they faced substantial
penalties unless they were able to explain where the money came from and whether it
was already taxed; however, there was a de minimis exemption from these requirements
for smaller deposits.
The announcement of what has come to be known as “demonetization” was very
much a surprise, and provides a rare opportunity to not only test the effects of this
particular initiative but also to derive more general insights into the phenomena of
corruption and tax evasion. In this paper we conduct an event study around the November
8, 2016 announcement, analyzing stock market reactions for different subsamples of
1

On corruption, see for instance Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Mauro (1995), Bardhan (1997), Basu, Basu
and Cordella (2016), Tanzi (1998) and Sah (2007), among many others. On tax evasion, see the various
articles collected in Dharmapala (2017).
2
See Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi, Notification No. 2652, 8
November 2016, available at: http://www.finmin.nic.in/172521.pdf [hereinafter Notification 2016]. This
was issued under Section 26(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934, which enables the Central
Government, on recommendation of the Central Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of India, to declare
any series of notes to no longer be legal tender.
3
See Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, March 31, 2016 (Part VIII – Currency Management),
available at: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1181, and Price Waterhouse
Coopers, Disrupting cash: Accelerating electronic payments in India, available at:
https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2015/disrupting-cash-accelerating-electronic-payments-inindia.pdf. Unaccounted-for cash is outside the formal financial system. In the Indian media, it is often
referred to as “black” money.
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Indian firms defined by industry, ownership structure and other characteristics. Our key
findings are that the industries thought to be most affected by corruption and tax evasion
did not experience substantially different market reactions, and that banks and stateowned enterprises (SOEs) were positively affected by the announcement. We explore
some of the implications of these findings below.
We begin with a simple illustrative model of transactions in the real estate sector,
where it is thought that unaccounted-for cash is widely used in order to evade a tax
known as “stamp duty.” 4 We show that under certain assumptions the magnitude of the
decline in the value of real estate firms around this announcement allows us to infer the
extent of tax evasion prior to demonetization. We then use daily stock price data from the
Prowess database to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the
demonetization announcement for real estate firms and for various other subgroups of
firms (defined using industry and ownership categorizations provided by Prowess and
various other sources).
Of course, the stock market’s reactions are just the earliest assessments of
demonetization’s likely effects. The predictions of stock market investors may of course
turn out ultimately to have been mistaken. The unprecedented scale of India’s
demonetization also makes it difficult to predict its effects. The actual effects will
become clearer as time progresses and more data becomes available. As of the time of
writing, however, these effects remain highly uncertain, and the initial stock market
reactions thus remain valuable as a guide. For our main results, there is no evidence for
the reversal of the initial reactions over the five-month period following the
announcement. In general, stock market reactions represent useful information from
parties who have their proverbial “ear to the ground” and have strong financial incentives
to predict these effects correctly. It is sometimes said that journalism is the first rough
draft of history, and the stock market reactions analyzed in this paper can analogously be
understood as a first draft of the story of the impact of this policy, and its wider
implications for understanding corruption and tax evasion.

4

See e.g. Dhaval Kulkarni “Demonetization hits real estate hard”, DNA India, December 2, 2016, available
at: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-demonetization-hits-real-estate-hard-2278879.
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It should be emphasized that our aim is not to measure the overall reaction of the
Indian stock market – which could potentially be affected by other events in the same
time period – but rather the differential reactions for different subgroups of firms (relative
to the overall market reaction). 5 A particularly noteworthy potential confounding event is
the US Presidential election of November 8, 2016, which took place on the same day and
also represented a dramatic surprise. While the US election may have affected the general
level of the Indian market, there does not seem to be any reason to think that it would
have differentially affected the sectors that we analyze. For example, we do not find
strong effects for sectors – such as information technology – that have particularly close
ties to the US, and are not aware of any evidence that specific sectors in non-US markets
were differentially affected by the US election.
We find a statistically significant market reaction of between -2% and -4%
(depending on the specification) for real estate firms. While there are a number of
important caveats, it appears that this relatively modest magnitude is consistent with
either a relatively small amount of tax evasion prior to demonetization, or with an
expectation that demonetization would have little impact on the prevalence of tax
evasion. We also find no detectable relationship between the CARs experienced by firms
around the demonetization announcement and an index of sector-level perceptions of the
prevalence of bribery (constructed by Transparency International (2011) based on global
survey data, as described in Section 4 below). These findings suggest that the market
expected the effects of demonetization on corruption and tax evasion across the economy
to be modest at best.
Indeed, most identifiable subgroups of Indian firms did not experience
substantially different reactions in relation to the overall market. The most striking results

5

Kumar (2017) studies the impact of the demonetization announcement on analysts’ forecasts of Indian
firms’ earnings per share, finding no substantial change in these estimates after the announcement.
However, the focus of Kumar (2017) is not on differences in market reactions across sectors. Jain, Shekhar
and Deshpande (2017) analyze market reactions, but only for the hospitality industry. In contrast, our
approach shares some similarities with recent studies of other “surprise” events elsewhere in the world.
Wagner, Zeckhauser and Ziegler (2017) analyze the stock market reactions around the 2016 US
Presidential election for subgroups of US firms defined by industry and other characteristics. Ramaiah,
Pham and Moosa (2017) analyze market reactions for subsets of UK firms around the June 2016 (“Brexit”)
referendum vote to leave the European Union. Davies and Studnicka (2017) analyze market reactions for
UK firms to the same event and to subsequent relevant events. They find that UK firms with stronger
supply chain linkages in Europe experienced more negative market reactions.
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relate to the banking sector and to SOEs. Banks experienced on average a positive and
statistically significant abnormal return of about 3% to 7% (depending on the
specification). This market expectation is somewhat puzzling. At a conceptual level, it is
unclear why demonetization (followed by remonetization) would by itself affect
households’ demand for cash and cash equivalents. More specifically, the observed
reaction requires that the market believed that demonetization would lead to a substantial
and persistent shift in the form of savings, from unaccounted-for cash to bank deposits
(i.e. an increase in “financial depth”). 6 Of course, the announcement was expected to lead
(as it in fact did) to a massive inflow of new deposits at banks. However, to explain a
substantial increase in the value of banks’ equity, it is necessary that these deposits were
expected not to be withdrawn (or otherwise used for consumption, for instance through
electronic payments) in the short-to-medium term; this would enable banks to increase
lending or other profitable activities. 7
Assessing whether this apparent market expectation was reasonable is quite
complicated. The government imposed restrictions on withdrawals until March 13, 2017.
From the available data, it does not seem that there was any noticeable increase in
withdrawals after the restrictions were lifted. Moreover, for a variety of reasons - legal,
practical and otherwise (discussed below in Section 5) - we think it unlikely that
individuals would have withdrawn much of what they deposited. Ultimately, it remains
an open question as to whether most of the new deposits will end up being withdrawn in
the short-to-medium term, but early evidence suggests withdrawals are quite limited.
Thus, stock market reactions remain a valuable source of information on perceived
longer-term effects.
The market expectation that banks would increase lending is consistent with
another of our results. We use a sector-level measure of the dependence of an industry on
external finance, constructed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and updated by Kroszner,
Laeven and Klingebiehl (2007), and find that the higher an industry’s dependence on
external finance the larger the CARs it experienced around the demonetization
6
The concept of financial depth measures the size of the formal financial sector relative to the size of the
economy – see e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000).
7
On November 30, 2016, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) changed the incremental reserve ratio for banks
to prevent an increase in lending out of the new deposits. However, this measure was short-lived (as it was
lifted on December 10, 2016) and is thus unlikely to have had much impact.
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announcement. This is consistent with the idea of banks having more investible capital
(due to new deposits), which is then invested in firms in industries most likely to seek
external finance.
We also find that SOEs experienced a positive and significant response of about
2% to 6% (depending on the specification). This result holds both for SOE banks (in
common with non-SOE banks) and for nonbank SOEs. The market expectation of an
increased value for SOEs is in some respects even more puzzling than that for banks.
Here, too, we do not necessarily have a complete explanation, but there is some evidence
consistent with a story centered on expectations of indirect effects on corruption. When
the government decided to act in an unprecedented manner that carried great political and
economic risk, it may have sent a (quite costly) signal about its seriousness in curtailing
corruption. This may involve in particular a crackdown on corruption at SOEs – either
because they are especially prone to corruption, or because they are easier for politicians
to influence.
Another related interpretation is that state ownership might serve as a proxy for
corruption risk. Industries are ranked on corruption risk (e.g. Transparency International
(2011)) in part due to their interaction with the government (or the degree of regulation
they face); state ownership involves a particularly high degree of interaction with the
government. Moreover, it is possible that the extent to which SOEs are susceptible to
corruption, relative to non-SOEs, is much greater than the differences in corruption
among non-SOEs that the Transparency International and other indices seek to capture.
This can potentially explain a large effect for SOEs, even though there is little evidence
that market reactions to demonetization were related to the prevalence of corruption in
different industries.
Both the bank and SOE findings are puzzling to some extent. Moreover, when we
construct a portfolio consisting of all of the banks in our sample, there is no evidence of a
reversal of the positive abnormal returns that occurred around demonetization during the
five months following the event (through the end of our dataset on March 31, 2017). The
same is true of a portfolio consisting of all of the SOEs in our sample. Thus, there is no
evidence that stock market investors reevaluated their initial reactions over this time
period.

5

While there are many important caveats (as discussed above), we think that these
results are intriguing and worthy of further exploration in future research. As more data
becomes available, it will be possible to analyze more directly many of the consequences
of demonetization. However, the initial stock market reactions are a valuable source of
guidance on expectations about longer-term effects.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the background to the
November 8, 2016 demonetization. Section 3 discusses the consequences of
demonetization and how stock market reactions can provide valuable insights. Section 4
describes our dataset and presents our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results
and their implications. Section 6 concludes.

2) Background
2.1) Announcements
On November 8, 2016 at about 8:00pm Indian Standard Time, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi of India gave an unscheduled television address in which he informed the
nation that from midnight the INR 500 (~USD 8) and 1000 (~USD 16) notes would no
longer be legal tender. This represented roughly 86% of the currency in circulation in
India, an economy that is estimated to conduct over 90% of its transactions in cash. 8
According to the Prime Minister, this extraordinary step was being taken due to concerns
about corruption, unaccounted-for cash, and counterfeiting that might aid terrorist
groups. 9 These notes could still be deposited at banks and post offices or exchanged for
other notes (including the soon-to-be-released new INR 500 notes and INR 2000 notes)
until December 30, 2016. Thereafter, the old INR 500 and 1000 notes would be
worthless. Note that the provision of new currency notes makes the demonetization in

8

See Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report, March 31, 2016 (Part VIII – Currency Management),
available at: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualReportPublications.aspx?Id=1181. See also Harish
Damodaran, “Are Banks equipped to replace 2,300 crore pieces of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 notes?”, Indian
Express, November 9, 2016. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/web-edits/rs-500-rs1000-notes-are-banks-equipped-to-replace-1874-crore-pieces-of-notes-4364746/.
On the size of the cash economy see Price Waterhouse Coopers, Disrupting cash: Accelerating electronic
payments in India, available at: https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2015/disrupting-cashaccelerating-electronic-payments-in-india.pdf.
9
Notification (2016); Abhinav Bhatt, “PM Modi Announces Notes Ban In Anti-Corruption Move, Millions
Face Cash Crunch” NDTV India, November 8, 2016. Available at: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pmmodi-speaks-to-nation-tonight-at-8-pm-1622948 [hereinafter Modi address 2016].
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reality a “re-monetization”, but because much of the commentary refers to the events of
November 8, 2016 as “demonetization” we use that terminology.
This was soon followed by further announcements from India’s central bank – the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) – and others about how the process would be regulated.
The old notes would not be recognized as legal tender starting from 12:00am November
9, 2016, 10 but credit card, debit card and other e-payment systems were not limited
(Notification 2016). Restrictions were placed on both bank deposits and withdrawals. If
the amount deposited was below INR 250,000 (~USD $4,000), the depositor would not
be required to explain where the funds were from (and whether tax was paid on them).11
However, if the depositor had not yet complied with “Know Your Customer” (KYC)
norms then the amount deposited could not exceed INR 50,000 (Notification 2016). If the
deposit amount was above INR 250,000 and no acceptable explanation about prior tax
payments was provided the depositor would have to pay the tax (~30% of the deposit
amount) and an additional fine/payment. 12 Although details of the taxes and penalties to

10

See Modi address 2016 and Press Releases, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New
Delhi, November 8, 2016 and December 1, 2016. Some exceptions were made for emergencies (e.g.,
paying hospital bills).
11
This arises by operation of Rule 114B, Income Tax Rules 1962 which lists transactions for which a
person must quote his or her permanent account number (PAN) – for example, deposits exceeding INR
250,000 in aggregate in one bank/post office for any one person in the deposit period – November 9, 2016
to December 30, 2016 (or INR 50,000 in a day in the same period) – and Rule 114E, Income Tax Rules
1962 which requires banks and post offices to report cash deposits exceeding INR 250,000 in aggregate
during the deposit period for any non-current accounts held by one person and INR 1,250,000 in aggregate
for any current accounts held by one person. These changes to the Income Tax Rules were published on
November 15, 2016. See Central Board of Direct Taxes, Notification No. 104/2016 Income Tax,
November 15, 2016.
12
The fine amount varied in the days after November 8, but it was roughly between 20% to 100% in
addition to the taxes, depending on the circumstances - see Amended Sections 115BBE, 119C to 119R, and
271AAB(1A) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1962 (Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act 2016, No. 48
of 2016, available at http://www.egazette.nic.in. The lowest amount that might be paid was if the depositor
availed of the “Taxation and Investment Regime for Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana” (sections 119C
to 119R noted above) that required the depositor to pay taxes of 30% on the undisclosed income that is
being deposited along with a “cess” of 33% of the tax paid (i.e., 10% of the deposit – 33% of 30%) and an
additional penalty of 10% - a total of 50%. However, the depositor also had to contribute 25% of the
deposit amount into a specific deposit scheme for 4 years with no interest. The money in the scheme was
to be used for a variety of state projects. The next highest amount would be under Section 115BBE where
someone declares undisclosed income but does not put it in the specific deposit scheme. Here the
individual pays 30% tax and what amounts to an additional 53.25% more (totaling 83.25%). Finally, the
highest amount (under Section 271AAB(1A)) was if the government detected the undisclosed income (i.e.,
the individual did not self report) in which case the tax of 30% would be accompanied by either a penalty
of about 77% or 107% depending on the circumstances. For instance, a person depositing INR 1,000,000
without a good explanation on tax payments might pay INR 300,000 as taxes owed and another INR
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be paid for unexplained deposited funds were not released on November 8, 2016, we
think it reasonable for the market to expect that there would be such taxes and penalties
based on prior amnesty schemes. 13
There were also limits on the amount that could be withdrawn. Initially, an
individual could only withdraw INR 4,000 per day from a bank account with a weekly
limit of INR 20,000 (Notification 2016), which was raised to INR 24,000 a week, then
INR 50,000 a week and then lifted altogether on March 13, 2017. 14 There were also
limits on withdrawals from ATMs, which started at INR 2,000 per day, but were
gradually raised and eventually eliminated on February 1, 2017. 15
Unsurprisingly, there was an intense rush to the banks as soon as they opened.
People were in queues for hours to both deposit and withdraw cash. 16 Given the
importance of cash transactions in India’s economy, it was essential for even salaried
individuals (who would have no difficulty showing they paid tax) to have cash on hand

530,000 approximately as penalty leaving a net deposit amount of about INR 170,000 (this example
assumes the depositor fits within amended section 115BBE noted above).
13
The more recent “amnesty” schemes for “black” money involved depositors paying the taxes and some
additional fee or penalty. For example, The Income Declaration Scheme, 2016 (from June 1, 2016 to Sept.
30, 2016) would allow people to declare income, pay taxes of 30% on it and additional penalties of 15% (a
total of 45% of the income declared). See Circular No. 16 of 2016, F.No.370142/8/2016-TPL, Government
of India, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Direct Taxes (TPL Division), May 20, 2016. Also see
http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/income-declaration-scheme.aspx, and
http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/ids-2016.aspx.
14
See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi, November 13,
2016; “RBI lifts all cash withdrawal limits from today”, Indian Express, March 13, 2017. Available at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/rbi-lifts-all-cash-withdrawal-limits-fromtoday-march-13-demonetisation-4567890/.
15
See “RBI: No limits on cash withdrawals through ATMs from February 1”, Indian Express, January 30,
2017. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/rbi-atm-withdrawallimit-february-demonetisation-note-ban-4499156/. There were also limits on the amount of notes that
could be exchanged for new notes – starting at INR 4,000 per person then INR 4,500 per person and then
back down to INR 2,000 per person with all exchanges being stopped as of November 25, 2016. See Press
Release, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi, November 17. 2016 and Sunny
Verma, “All note exchange stopped from today, PM Modi goes back on promise of hike after November
24”, Indian Express, November 25, 2016. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-newsindia/pm-modi-said-exchange-limit-to-be-hiked-after-november-24-exchange-stopped-4393985/.
16
"Queues get longer at banks, ATMs on weekend", The Hindu, 12 November 2016. Available at:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Queues-get-longer-at-banks-ATMs-onweekend/article16443670.ece, Geeta Anand, “Indians Rush Frantically to Launder Their ‘Black Money’”,
New York Times, November 20, 2016. Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/asia/modi-rupees-india-corruption.html, Mayuresh Ganapatye,
"Demonetisation: Month later, long queues still outside banks and ATMs in Mumbai", India Today,
December 8, 2016. Available at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/demonetisation-long-queues-banksatms-mumbai/1/830100.html.
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for daily expenses. The queues were a daily occurrence for weeks and began to diminish
only as more cash became available and as withdrawal limits were eased. 17
2.2) Context
This is the third time in the last 70 years that India has demonetized some part of
its currency. In 1946, the INR 1000 and 10,000 notes were demonetized, and in 1978 the
INR 1000, 5,000 and 10,000 notes were demonetized. 18 The motivation was similar – to
try to address concerns with unaccounted-for cash and its accompanying ills.

19

Demonetization has also occurred in other parts of the world and is typically motivated
by similar concerns, as well as by inflation and by changes in currency (e.g., upon the
introduction of the Euro). 20 However, the November 8, 2016 demonetization differed
markedly from earlier episodes in India and elsewhere in its vast scale and in the surprise
nature of the announcement. Whereas earlier demonetizations in India and elsewhere
usually affected only the highest value notes in the economy, 21 the November 8, 2016
demonetization targeted fairly moderate-value notes that made up the vast amount of
currency in circulation (86% is a frequently used estimate). Combined with the surprise
nature of the announcement - according to some reports, only 10 people in the entire

17

"28 days of demonetisation: No let-up in rush at banks, ATMs”, Economic Times, December 6, 2016.
Available at: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/banking/28-days-ofdemonetisation-no-let-up-in-rush-at-banks-atms/articleshow/55838985.cms, George Mathew and
Khushboo Narayan, "As ATMs dry up, bankers say normalcy will return soon", Indian Express, April 12,
2017. Available at: http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/as-atms-dry-up-bankerssay-normalcy-will-return-soon-4609546/.
18
Vikram Doctor, "The cycles of demonetisation: A looks back at two similar experiments in 1946 and
1978",
Economic
Times
Blog,
November
12,
2016.
Available
at:
http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/onmyplate/the-cycles-of-demonetisation-a-looks-back-at-twosimilar-experiments-in-1946-and-1978/.
19
Doctor (2016), Gopika Gopakumar and Vishwanath Nair, "Rs 500, Rs 1000 notes may be back, if history
is a guide", Live Mint, November 9, 2016.
20
In the US demonetization is currently prohibited (Coinage Act 1965), but in the past there has been
demonetization of silver – Friedman (1990), Weinstein (1967). In the Eurozone see Council Regulation
(EC) No. 975/98 (1998) of 3 May 1998, in the UK see the Coinage Age 1971 (c. 24) and in Venezuela see
“Venezuela’s lunatic experiment in demonetization”, The Economist, December 15, 2016. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21711937-nicol-s-maduros-latest-act-economicsabotage-cancelling-100-bol-var.
21
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, Aspects of Black Money (1985), available at:
http://www.nipfp.org.in/book/927/, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Measures to Tackle
Black Money in India and Abroad (2012a), available at:
http://www.dor.gov.in/sites/upload_files/revenue/files/Measures_Tackle_BlackMoney.pdf, Ministry of
Finance, Department of Revenue, White Paper on Black Money (2012b), available at:
http://www.finmin.nic.in/reports/whitepaper_blackmoney2012.pdf. Indeed, targeting high value notes is
something that has recently been discussed in the US (Rogoff, 2016).
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country of 1.25 billion people were aware of plans to demonetize 22 - this created the
potential for large scale economic disruption.
Both the scale and secrecy of this demonetization appear to be in response to
increased concerns over corruption and unaccounted-for cash. Most global rankings place
India in the middle of countries in terms of perceived corruption risks, while many
domestic studies in India suggest high levels of corruption and tax evasion. 23 Further,
there have been numerous reports on unaccounted-for cash, and steps taken by the
Government and the Courts to address it that have met with only limited success. 24
Prior to the November 8, 2016 announcement, the Government of India had
instituted various “amnesties” for black money and had been engaged in attempting to get
more people to open bank accounts. 25 Although some of these measures had met with
some success, many others seemed to have languished. Moreover, there appeared to be
general agreement that for India to continue to grow economically something needed to

22

Arup Roychoudhury, "Demonetisation: In the works for 6 months, 10 people in the loop, including
Raghuram Rajan", Business Standard India, November 10, 2016, available at: http://www.businessstandard.com/article/economy-policy/demonetisation-in-the-works-for-6-months-10-people-in-the-loopincluding-raghuram-rajan-116111000009_1.html. It is noteworthy that banks were aware of the new INR
2000 note, but not that it was part of a plan to demonetize. The secrecy was apparently considered
necessary in order to ensure that people who had large amounts of “black” money or corruption rents would
not have time to funnel the money out of India and avoid the effects of demonetization. In other words, this
demonetization was presented as attempting to not only effect matters going forward but also to penalize
those who had already accumulated large amounts of cash in questionable or illicit ways. One measure of
the secrecy was a report that the Cabinet was unaware of the plan for demonetization until about one hour
before the Prime Minister addressed the nation. See Roychoudhury, ibid.
23
See Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International (2016) ranking India as 79th out of 176
countries, available at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016. In
addition, it has been noted that corruption is likely holding India’s growth down (Debroy and Bhandari,
2011; KPMG, Survey on Bribery and Corruption – Impact on Economy and Business
Environment). See also Nirvikar Singh, “The Trillion Dollar Question”, Financial Express, December 19,
2010, available at: http://www.financialexpress.com/archive/the-trilliondollar-question/726482/0/, “India’s
Bureaucracy Ranked Worst in Asia”, BBC News, January 12, 2012, available at:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-16523672.
24
See the citations in fn. 19. The Supreme Court of India also ordered the formation of a Special
Investigative Team to look into “black” money and to try to recover it. See Ram Jethmalani & Ors v.
Union of India & Ors, 2011 8 SCC 1,
http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/17620093472011p.txt. The Government of India also has also
attempted to get information from Swiss Banking authorities on accounts held by Indians that may be a
repository of “black” money. See Vicky Nanjappa, “Swiss black money can take India to the top”,
Rediff.com, March 31, 2009, available at: http://election.rediff.com/interview/2009/mar/31/inter-swissblack-money-can-take-india-to-the-top.htm, but see Ministry of Finance (2012b) .Concerns with “black”
money pre-date India’s Independence in 1947. See C.W. Ayers, S.P. Chambers and J.B. Vachha, Income
Tax Enquiry Report, 1936, Submitted to the Government of India as a Result of the Investigation of the
Indian Income Tax System (1936).
25
See Ministry of Finance (2012a, 2012b), Ram Jethmalani & Ors. V. Union of India (2011).
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be done to rein in corruption and curtail the spread of unaccounted-for cash, amongst
other things (e.g. Debroy and Bhandari, 2011, Singh, 2010, Colvin, 2011).
Against this background, the plans for demonetization appear to have been in
process for some time. The new INR 2000 note was announced months before November
2016. 26 Further, prior to demonetization there had been efforts made by the government
to enhance the number of people with identity cards (the “Aadhar” scheme), to open new
bank accounts for people (the “Jan Dhan” initiative), to have more people with a personal
account number (“PAN” card), and to enable more mobile banking. 27 All of these steps –
although not necessarily motivated by a plan to demonetize – helped to lay the
groundwork for demonetization and its potential impact on India. It is also noteworthy
that the PAN card when combined with the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002
(PMLA) means that any person withdrawing cash above certain amounts from a bank
account can be tracked under PMLA with the use of the PAN card (which that person
must have in order to obtain a bank account). Of course, whether this tracking will
happen remains to be seen, but the scaffolding appears to be in place. This tracking
infrastructure can potentially explain why it may be difficult to use cash that has been
deposited in the banking system subsequently for corrupt activities. 28
2.3) Initial Responses
Following the demonetization announcement, there was a scramble by the general
public to find ways to get value for their currency notes for which they did not have proof
of taxes having been paid. A variety of schemes have been reported, including the

26

Marya Shakil, “Don't Panic, Printing of New Currency Notes Began Months Ago”, CNN-News18,
available at: http://www.news18.com/news/india/dont-panic-the-printing-of-new-currency-notes-beganmonths-ago-1309747.html.
27
Aadhar Act 2016. Aadhar is the world’s largest biometric ID system with over 1 billion people being a
part of it (it is a 12 digit unique-identity number issued to all Indian residents). See Public Data Portal
State Wise Saturation, https://uidai.gov.in/. The “Jan Dhan” initiative (formally “Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan
Yojana”) is the Government of India’s program for enhancing availability of Financial services to the
population in an affordable manner – thus far (April 2017) about 280 million bank accounts have been
opened under the initiative since it started in August 2014, though a number of the accounts have a zero
balance (about 24% on the latest figures from April 2017). See www.pmjdy.gov.in. There are plans to use
this to roll out more mobile banking initiatives. The PAN card is a unique 10-character alpha-numeric
identifier used for tax purposes in India under the Indian Income Tax Act 1961.
28
We do not discuss how parties in India generate and then launder “black” money. For more discussion,
see the Ministry of Finance publications cited above and Jindal (2016).
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purchase of jewelry, 29 purchasing tickets on Indian Railways (an arm of the Government)
to then later cancel the tickets and get “official” cash back from the Railways, 30 bribing
bank and government officials, backdating accounting entries, and giving money to
temples in order to get it back later in some form. 31
As the government sought to block these types of schemes, it appears that people
started trying to deposit money into bank accounts of other people (typically those with
less than INR 250,000 to deposit) in order to avoid questioning on the source and tax
status of the income. 32 This of course involved a fair amount of risk that the depositor
might not give the money back to the original party. It appears that intermediaries arose
(seemingly instantaneously) who would – for a price – offer to help someone split their
cash into smaller chunks and have people ready to deposit who would later give back the

29

Rutam Vora, “Gold rush keeps jewelers buzzing past midnight”, Business Line, The Hindu, November 9,
2016. Available at: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/markets/gold/gold-rush-kept-jewellers-buzzingpast-midnight/article9323397.ece.
30
Manthank Mehtal, "Railways sets Rs. 5000 as cash refund limit for tickets", Times of India, November
16, 2016. Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Rlys-sets-5000-as-cash-refundlimit-for-tickets/articleshow/55444673.cms, “No cash refunds for cancelled tickets above Rs. 10,000, The
New Indian Express, November 10, 2016. Available at:
http://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2016/nov/10/no-cash-refunds-for-cancelled-tickets-above-rs10000-1537114.html, Siddharth Prabhakari, "Railway tickets booked between Nov 16 and 24 for Rs 5,000
and above won’t be refunded in cash", Times of India, November 15, 2016. Available at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Railway-tickets-booked-between-Nov-16-and-24-for-Rs-5000and-above-wont-be-refunded-in-cash/articleshow/55439814.cms.
31
Pranshu Rathi, "Back-dated receipts used for Apple iPhone sales after demonetisation: Report", IB
Times, November 29, 2016, available at: http://www.ibtimes.co.in/back-dated-receipts-used-apple-iphonesales-after-demonetisation-report-706095, Khushboo Narayan, "Tiffin service to dental implants: All tried
to beat system, swap old notes", Indian Express, December 5, 2016. Available at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/demonetisation-tiffin-service-to-dental-implants-all-tried-to-beatsystem-swap-old-notes-income-tax-department-raids-4410874/, Appu Esthose Suresh "Demonetisation
violation? Banks accepted over Rs 1 lakh crore without PAN details", Hindustan Times, March 16, 2017.
Available at: http://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/demonetisation-in-possible-violation-banksaccepted-over-1-crore-lakh-deposits-without-pan/story-bQbHbFtBgggK7fFh5j0jqI.html, Madhuparna Das,
"Enforcement Directorate raids forex shops making back date entries", Economic Times, November 16,
2016. Available at: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/enforcementdirectorate-raids-forex-shops-making-back-date-entries/articleshow/55373554.cms, Ram Sehgal,
“Jewellers issue backdated invoices to clients”, Economic Times, November 10, 2016. Available at:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/commodities/news/jewellers-issue-backdated-invoices-toclients/articleshow/55349735.cms.
32
Khushboo Narayan, “Expect all demonetised money to come back to system: Revenue Secretary
Hasmukh Adhia”, Indian Express, December 8 2016. Available at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/expect-all-demonetised-money-to-come-back-tosystem-revenue-secretary-hasmukh-adhia-4414447/.
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money. 33 As this method of evasion became noticeable, the government began to use
indelible ink marks on depositors’ fingers to ensure that such “marked” depositors would
find it more difficult to deposit again. 34
Despite such government responses, it appears clear that many people were able
circumvent the restrictions and deposit their cash (at some cost). This is perhaps most
clearly indicated by how much cash came into the banks by December 30, 2016. Prior to
demonetization estimates of the total amount of unaccounted for currency were in the
range of INR 15.4 Trillion, of which a staggering INR 14.97 Trillion was deposited by
December 30, 2016 (roughly 97% and amounting to about USD 220 Billion). 35 This
suggests that either the initial estimate of unaccounted for money was too low or that
people evaded the restrictions or some mix of both.
This outcome has been viewed by some in the media as evidence of a partial or
complete failure of demonetization. 36 Over time, the political discourse surrounding
demonetization has shifted, with the Government suggesting that one of its goals was to
get more money into the formal sector and jumpstart “cash-less” or e-payments
structures. 37 Although that might be viewed as making lemonade from lemons, it is clear

33
Swati Bhat and Rahul Bhatia, “While India plugs black money holes, Indians find leaks”, Reuters,
November 11, 2016. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-modi-corruption-taxesidUSKBN1360UO.
34
"To reduce crowds at banks, ATMs, indelible ink to mark fingers of those who have exchanged old
notes", Times of India, November 15, 2016. Available at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indelible-ink-to-mark-fingers-of-those-who-have-exchangedcash/articleshow/55431492.cms, Surabhi, “Now, an indelible mark to stop multiple note swaps”, Business
Line, The Hindu, November 15, 2016. Available at: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-andbanking/banks-to-use-indelible-ink-to-prevent-repeated-withdrawals-by-same-person/article9348231.ece.
35
Siddhartha Singh and Bibhudatta Pradhan,"As much as 97% of the Banned Notes Are Back in Banks:
Report". NDTV, January 5, 2017. Available at: http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/indians-said-to-deposit97-of-notes-banned-to-curb-graft-1645071, "97% of scrapped notes deposited with banks as on Dec 30:
Report”, Times of India, January 5, 2017. Available at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-features/business/97-of-scrapped-notes-deposited-with-banks-as-ondec-30-report/articleshow/56344692.cms.
36
See “Demonetisation complete failure? 97% of banned notes back in banks: Report”, Indian Express,
January 5, 2017. Available at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/demonetisation-complete-failure-97-ofbanned-notes-back-in-banks-report/.
37
Anuradha Sharma, “If India's Demonetization Was All About Going Digital, Then Why the Rush?”, The
Diplomat, December 1, 2016, Available at:
http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/if-indias-demonetization-was-all-about-going-digital-then-why-the-rush/.
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that the Government had for some time been trying to increase the size of the banked
population and to increase the amount of funds in the formal economy. 38
The economic disruption caused by demonetization led to the International
Monetary Fund revising downwards India’s estimated rate of economic growth. 39
However, while demonetization has undoubtedly caused serious disruptions, fears of
widespread unrest and chaos have not materialized. For instance, some opposition parties
called for strikes and other kinds of resistance activities. 40 There were also lawsuits filed
against the demonetization process, but thus far those suits have not borne fruit. 41 Despite
these signs of opposition, there has been little political cost of demonetization to the
governing party. On the contrary, the Prime Minister and his political party (the BJP)
have done very well in state elections following the announcement of demonetization. 42

3) Stock Market Reactions and the Consequences of Demonetization
38

See Sharma (2016); which is also bolstered by the Government’s efforts toward Aadhar, Jan Dhan and
PAN cards amongst others discussed earlier in the text. Arguably, the demonetization event should have
generated positive returns for firms offering e-payment and e-wallet platforms. However, this is difficult to
test because our sample does not include any specialized e-payment firms (typically, these would be new
startups that are not publicly listed). Some banks in our sample offer e-payment products, but it is difficult
to distinguish the impact of this from the general effect of demonetization on banks.
39
See “Note ban: IMF cuts India's growth rate to 6.6% from 7.6%” Times of India, January 16, 2017,
available at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/note-ban-imf-cuts-indias-growth-rate-to-6-6from-7-6/articleshow/56601209.cms.
40
"Demonetisation: Opposition calls for countrywide protest on November 28”, Indian Express, November
23, 2016. Available at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/demonetisation-oppostion-parties-countrywideprotest-bandh-call-november-28-4391208/, Manoj CG, "Demonetisation: Opposition parties join hands, to
hold 'protest day' on November 28", Indian Express, November 24, 2016.
Available at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/demonetisation-opposition-parties-join-hands-to-holdprotest-day-on-november-28-4391937/.
41
Given the time that has elapsed, one suspects the demonetization would either be held to be legal or a fait
accompli such that the courts may not intervene. Vidya Venkat, Government’s Demonetisation Move Faces
Legal Challenge, The Hindu, December 2, 2016. Available at:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Government%E2%80%99s-demonetisation-move-faces-legalchallenge/article16744775.ece. “Five Reasons Why the Recent Demonetisation May Be Legally
Unsound”, The Wire, November 20, 2016. Available at:
https://thewire.in/81325/demonetisation-legally-unsound/. The Delhi High Court ruled that the withdrawal
restrictions on cash were not illegal. See Ashok Sharma v. Union of India [Writ Petition (Civil) No.
11130/2016, order dated 02.12.2016], although this has been appealed to a full Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court of India.
42
See Ravi Agrawal, “Why the Indian State Elections Matter to the Whole World”, CNN, March 13. 2017.
Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/11/asia/uttar-pradesh-elections/index.html, “Uttar Pradesh
election results: All You Need To Know”, Times of India, March 11, 2017. Available at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/elections/assembly-elections/uttar-pradesh/news/uttar-pradesh-elections2017-results-all-you-need-to-know/articleshow/57585921.cms.
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3.1) A Simple Illustrative Model of Tax Evasion in the Real Estate Sector
Extensive tax evasion via the use of unaccounted-for cash has been anecdotally
discussed in India’s real estate sector. 43 In this section, we develop a simple model of
evasion in real estate purchases. While the model is highly stylized, it illustrates how
estimates of changes in the value of real estate firms around the demonetization
announcement of November 8 can potentially be useful in inferring the magnitude of tax
evasion.
The Indian Stamp Act of 1899 imposed a tax based on the value of transactions in
real property, known as “stamp duty” (e.g. Alm, Annez and Modi, 2004). This tax
continues to be imposed on sales of property, with the rate varying across states; for
illustrative purposes below, we use a rate of 10% of the property value, which is fairly
typical. The legal incidence of stamp duty falls on the buyer of property. However, as
illustrated by the bargaining framework we use below, the economic incidence will
generally be shared by the buyer and seller. Thus, evasion of stamp duty will in general
raise the value of firms selling real estate.
Assume a real estate company that constructs or purchases a building at a cost of
C. It then sells the building to a buyer who values it at V > C. Stamp duty is imposed on
this transaction at a rate t, based on the reported sale price. For instance, if the parties
report the true price paid (defined as P0), then a tax of tP0 must be paid. Prior to the
demonetization announcement, however, the buyer can use unaccounted-for cash for part
of the payment, and so the parties can report a price lower than P0 in order to reduce the
amount of stamp duty paid.
In an effort to limit underreporting, many Indian states have imposed a minimum
presumptive value of property - known as the “circle rate” - for purposes of stamp duty
(e.g. Venkataraman, 2015). Suppose that there is a minimum value M that can be
reported, based on the circle rate that is defined by the state government’s revenue
authority. As long as the circle rate is below the market value (as is likely to be the case
when property values are rising and circle rates are revised infrequently) there is some
scope for evasion. In our simple setting, the parties always choose to report a price of M.
43

See e.g. Dhaval Kulkarni “Demonetization hits real estate hard”, DNA India, December 2, 2016,
available at: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-demonetization-hits-real-estate-hard-2278879.
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The true price P0 is assumed to be determined by a process of Nash bargaining
between the seller and the buyer, with the seller obtaining a fraction α of the joint surplus.
Thus, the true price P0 can be defined as follows:
𝑃𝑃0 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)

(1)

The amount of underreporting is thus (P0 – M); the buyer pays M using regular
(“accounted-for”) funds and (P0 – M) using unaccounted-for cash. The ratio of the
𝑀𝑀

reported to the true price (on which we focus below) is 𝑃𝑃 . The value of the real estate
0

firm, П0, is defined as the price it receives, minus its cost. Thus,
Π0 = 𝑃𝑃0 − 𝐶𝐶

(2)

Note that the government observes M (the reported price), but not 𝑉𝑉 and 𝑃𝑃0 . In a
complete information setting, it would be possible to infer 𝑃𝑃0 using Equation (1) above.

However, this is not possible for the government – even if the cost C is known – if it does
not know the buyer’s valuation 𝑉𝑉.

Now, suppose that a change – such as the demonetization – makes it impossible

for buyers to use unaccounted-for cash. Then, all of the funds used for payment are
traceable, and the parties must, by assumption, report the true price P1. This price can
thus be defined as:
𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉 − 𝐶𝐶 − 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃1 )

Rearranging,

𝑃𝑃1 =

(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼
1 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼

(3)

(4)

The real estate firm’s profits are now given by:

Π1 = 𝑃𝑃1 − 𝐶𝐶

Note that, in general, 𝑃𝑃1 < 𝑃𝑃0 .

(5)

The proportional change in firm value upon the announcement of the policy

change that eliminates unaccounted-for cash can be characterized as follows:
∆𝛱𝛱 ≡

𝛱𝛱1 − 𝛱𝛱0 𝑃𝑃1 − 𝑃𝑃0
=
𝛱𝛱0
𝑃𝑃0 − 𝐶𝐶

(6)

The event study approach that we use is capable of estimating ∆Π. Thus, assuming that C
can be observed, it is possible to infer the unknown value of 𝑃𝑃0 by rearranging the

equation above:
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𝑃𝑃0 =

𝑃𝑃1 + 𝐶𝐶∆𝛱𝛱
1 + ∆𝛱𝛱

(7)

The magnitude of the estimated ∆Π can be used to infer the extent of tax evasion

behavior prior to the withdrawal of cash. For instance, consider a simple numerical

example where C = 80, V = 150, α = 0.5, and t = 10%. It follows from Equation (4) that
𝑃𝑃1 = 109.5. Suppose that the estimated ∆Π = 2%. From Equation (7), we can then infer

that 𝑃𝑃0 = 110. Note that this is consistent with M = 100 – rearranging Equation (1) yields:
𝑀𝑀 =

(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃0
= 100
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼

(8)

It follows that the ratio of the reported price to the true price is 100/110, or approximately
90%. Thus, an estimated ∆Π = 2% would be consistent with evasion being relatively
modest in magnitude.

Alternatively, suppose that (under assumptions that are otherwise the same), the
estimated ∆Π = 8%. From the equation above, we can then infer that 𝑃𝑃0 = 112. Note that
this is consistent with M = 60 – rearranging Equation (1) yields:
𝑀𝑀 =

(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐶𝐶 + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 𝑃𝑃0
= 60
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼

(9)

It follows that the extent of evasion, as measured by the ratio of the reported price to the
true price is 60/112, or approximately 54%. Thus, an estimated ∆Π = 8% would be

consistent with evasion being substantial in magnitude, with only a little over half the
payment being in accounted-for cash. This simple example illustrates that the estimated
impact of demonetization on the value of firms can potentially be useful in inferring the
magnitude of tax evasion.
This is of course a highly stylized model. For demonetization to have a substantial
impact on tax evasion, it is necessary that a large fraction of unaccounted-for wealth was
held in cash, and specifically in the form of 500 and 1000 INR notes. However, the
available evidence suggests that unaccounted-for wealth is mostly held in other forms,
such as jewelry, foreign currency, and various other types of assets (Chakravorti, 2017).
Moreover, it is also necessary that remonetization (through the newly issued notes) does
not enable the use of cash for tax evasion to the same extent as before. As discussed
earlier, once money is in the formal sector then it becomes traceable by the authorities. In
particular, various Income Tax Rules and PMLA provisions require reporting of large
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withdrawals. In principle, this may deter the use of the new notes for tax evasion, but
much depends on the efficacy of this tracing process.
Unaccounted-for cash is thought to be widely used not only for tax evasion
purposes, but also for making corrupt payments. Similar considerations apply in
determining whether it is likely that demonetization could reduce corrupt payments. It
would have to be the case that corrupt payments were frequently made in the form of
unaccounted-for cash in 500 and 1000 INR notes. Moreover, it would also have to be the
case that the traceability of the new notes issued after demonetization deters their use in
future corrupt payments to a significant degree.
3.2) Other Hypotheses
Although corruption and tax evasion were the issues most discussed by the
government and the media in relation to demonetization, there are other effects to
consider. For example, stock market reactions may vary across industries because
corruption is more prevalent in certain sectors. To the extent that demonetization is
anticipated to reduce corruption, firms in these sectors may be harmed because corrupt
payments can no longer be used to evade burdensome regulations; on the other hand, they
may benefit because the informal “tax” associated with corrupt payments to officials is
reduced. In the empirical analysis, we use a measure of the prevalence of corruption
across different sectors (constructed by Transparency International (2011)) to test for
such effects. Further, it is also possible that industries that are thought to serve as
repositories for unaccounted-for cash (such as real estate and jewelry) may experience
negative returns.
Because the demonetization process entailed large deposits in the banking system,
it is possible that banks are particularly affected by the November 8 announcement. In
particular, if it were anticipated that a substantial fraction of the deposits would not be
immediately withdrawn upon remonetization, then the banks would have additional net
deposits that could potentially be lent out and generate returns. On the other hand, the
demonetization was, as previously described, accompanied by a remonetization; thus, it is
possible that the increase in deposits would be purely transitory, with similar amounts
being rapidly withdrawn upon the availability of the new notes. In this latter scenario, no
major impact on banks’ profitability would be expected. Related to this, the industries
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that are more dependent on the type of financing banks provide stand to benefit too
because their capital constraints have been eased when banks have more funds available
to lend. Industries which are more dependent on external finance than others (e.g.,
pharmaceuticals) are the ones most likely to benefit from this.
In addition to industry effects, it appears useful to examine the effects on firms
based on their ownership structure. For example, many Indian firms belong to family run
business groups that are thought to keep fairly opaque accounts of inter-affiliate
transactions (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). These firms may present different risks than do
standalone private Indian firms or foreign-owned firms. SOEs may behave differently
along many dimensions, both because they have a mandate that goes beyond profitmaking and because they have more interaction with the State than do other firms. This
latter consideration is often a key basis used by organizations in ranking more corrupt
industries. SOEs have greater interactions with the State and hence may have more
opportunities for corrupt practices. We discuss this possibility further in Section 5
because the connection between ownership structure and corruption has not been
something on which most scholars or organizations ranking corruption seem to focus. 44
This summary indicates that the effects of demonetization are likely to be
multifarious and some may take years to be visible in the data. In light of this, our
research strategy is to examine the market’s reaction to this sudden announcement. We
note again that there are reasons to think the market may not fully estimate all effects and
many things may be unknown at the time of the market reaction, but the market reaction
does reflect the perceptions of individuals and groups that are thought to have a good
sense of the pulse of the economy and have strong financial incentives to predict these
effects correctly. Their reactions are worthy of exploration and their initial inclinations
may contain information of relevance in assessing some of the effects of demonetization.
It is to this that we now turn.
44

There is relatively little literature on this point. Nguyen and van Dijk (2012) find evidence from Vietnam
that a corrupt local business environment hinders the growth of non-SOEs but not the growth of SOEs. Lin
et al. (2016) analyze market reactions for Chinese firms around a major anti-corruption reform launched on
December 4, 2012. They find that SOEs experience positive returns, which they interpret as being
consistent with reductions in managers’ private benefits. Another recent paper that uses SOEs in a
corruption context is Ke, Liu and Tang (2017) but they do not provide a theoretical explanation for why
SOEs might be different than other firms from the perspective of corruption. We discuss that issue in
greater depth in Section 5.
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4) Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1) Data
Our study uses daily stock price trading data to examine the market’s assessment
of the likely effects of demonetization around its announcement on November 8, 2016.
Stock price data is obtained from Prowess, a comprehensive database on publicly traded
Indian firms that is maintained by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy
(CMIE). Stock price data is available in Prowess for each trading day. We use daily
Prowess stock price data through the conclusion of the fiscal year ending on March 31,
2017.
Prowess also provides financial statement data reported on an annual basis, as of
the end of each fiscal year (i.e. March 31 of a given year). For the regression analysis
described below, we match the event date to the closest corresponding fiscal year to
obtain the corresponding financial statement data (in particular, the November 8, 2016
event date is matched to the 2016 fiscal year, the most recently completed fiscal year as
of that event date). Our regression analysis uses data on total assets, profits (in particular,
profits before depreciation, interest and taxes), advertising, and marketing expenses from
the “consolidated accounts” reported in Prowess. 45 As advertising and marketing have a
substantial number of missing values, we follow past literature using Prowess data (e.g.
Dharmapala and Khanna, 2013a, 2016a) and treat missing observations of advertising
and marketing expenses as zeroes. Total assets are used in our analysis primarily as an
indicator of firm size, while profits are a measure of the firm’s performance. Advertising
and marketing expenses serve as proxies for the extent to which firms are “consumerfacing.” Firms that sell directly to consumers may have experienced negative reactions
based on disruption to their sales due to the limited ability of consumers to use cash for
purchases for a period following the demonetization announcement.
Prowess also reports the ownership structure of each firm. In particular, Prowess
reports whether each firm is part of a business group, under foreign ownership, or an
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Sales revenue is another potential control variable, but it is not included in our analysis because it is
missing for a large fraction of banks. Banks are of particular interest in our study, so it would be
problematic to omit them from the analysis.
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SOE. We use these ownership variables in our analysis to construct indicator variables
for SOEs, firms that belong to business groups, and foreign-owned firms.
Another crucial element of our analysis involves classifying firms by industry.
Prowess classifies firms into industries using a 5-digit National Industrial Classification
(NIC) code. We use the NIC codes to construct indicator variables for specific industries
of relevance for our analysis. For example, we construct an indicator variable for banks
using the NIC code 64191 (which encompasses “banking services” and “other fee based
financial services”). Similarly, we construct an indicator for firms in the real estate sector
using NIC codes 68100 (“commercial complexes”) and 41001 (“housing construction”).
For some of our tests, we use additional data sources. We obtain from
Transparency International (2011) a sector-level index of perceptions of bribery. The
index is based on a global survey of business executives, and represents an average of the
responses to three questions in Transparency International’s “Bribe Payers Survey”.
Respondents were asked “How often do firms in each sector: a) engage in bribery of lowlevel public officials, for example to speed up administrative processes and/or facilitate
the granting of licenses?; b) use improper contributions to high-ranking politicians or
political parties to achieve influence?; and c) pay or receive bribes from other private
firms?” The resulting index takes on values from 0-10, where higher values indicate less
corruption. Transparency International (2011) reports this index for 19 different sectors,
ranging from “agriculture” and “light manufacturing” (each of which has the highest
value of 7.1, indicating a relatively low susceptibility to corruption) to “public works
contracts and construction” (with a value of 5.3, the most corrupt sector). Note that these
perceptions of corruption are not specific to India, but rather represent a global
assessment by sector. We match these 19 sectors by hand to the 5-digit NIC codes in
Prowess. Of the approximately 3000 firms for which we have stock price data, we match
2125 to sectors that are covered by the Transparency International (2011) index.
We also conduct a test of the relationship between stock market reactions to
demonetization and a measure of the dependence of different sectors on external finance.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct a measure of the extent to which firms in a given
industry depend on external financing for investment needs. This measure is based on the
difference between cash flows from operations and capital expenditures for US
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manufacturing firms, at the industry level, computed using Compustat data for the
1980’s. Higher values of the measure indicate that an industry has a greater need for
external finance (i.e. that its capital expenditures exceed its cash flows from operations).
While this measure is based on US data, it is intended to reflect fundamental
technological characteristics of different industries, and has been widely used in studies
of countries around the world. We use an updated version of the Rajan-Zingales measure,
constructed by Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiehl (2007), using Compustat data for US
manufacturing firms for the 1980’s and 1990’s.
The Rajan-Zingales measure is reported only for manufacturing industries, using
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes for industries. We translate
these ISIC industry codes to the 5-digit NIC codes used in Prowess using a concordance
between the ISIC and NIC systems created by Sivadasan (2009). 46 Of the approximately
3000 firms for which we have stock price data, we match 1516 to sectors that are covered
by the Rajan-Zingales measure (bearing in mind that the latter only exists for
manufacturing industries).
4.2) Event Study Approach
The event of interest in our study is the announcement by the Prime Minister on
November 8, 2016. As the announcement was made in the evening after the close of
trading, we treat the event date as being November 9, 2016 (the first day on which news
of the announcement could have affected prices). Using daily stock price data from
Prowess, we compute abnormal returns for the firms in our sample over (-1, +1), (-2, +2),
and (-3, +3) event windows, where day zero is November 9, 2016. For example, for the (3, +3) window, we calculate the market reaction for each firm over a period extending
from 3 trading days prior to the event to 3 trading days following the event – i.e.
November 4 to November 15.
Event studies use a variety of approaches to estimate firms’ normal or predicted
returns. We use the market model, which does not rely on any specific economic
assumptions. The market model uses daily returns for each firm i and for the market, and
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We are grateful to Jagadeesh Sivadasan for providing this concordance, and to Rafeh Qureshi of the
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics for assistance with the matching of these codes.

22

can be represented as follows (e.g. Bhagat and Romano, 2002, p. 146; Dharmapala and
Khanna, 2016a, b):
𝑅𝑅it = 𝑎𝑎i + 𝑏𝑏i𝑀𝑀t + 𝑒𝑒it

(10)

where Rit is firm i’s return on day t, 𝑀𝑀t is the market return on day t, and 𝑒𝑒it is the error
term. For the market return, we follow prior literature (e.g. Dharmapala and Khanna,
2016b) and use the BSE200 index reported in the Prowess database.
We run the regression in Equation (10) separately for each firm over an
estimation window that consists of a year of daily returns data prior to the (-3, +3) event
window. We use the results to compute a predicted return (𝑅𝑅�𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤 ) for each firm on each day

of the relevant event window. Specifically, 𝑅𝑅�𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤 = 𝑎𝑎� + 𝑏𝑏�𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 , where 𝑎𝑎� and 𝑏𝑏� are the

estimated coefficients from the regression in Equation (10) for each firm i. We then
subtract this predicted return from the actual return (𝑅𝑅it) on each day of the event window
to obtain the abnormal return (ARit) for each firm i on each of the days in the event
window. Thus,
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅�𝚤𝚤𝚤𝚤

(11)

These abnormal returns are then summed to compute cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) for each firm for each of the event windows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = � 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(12)

𝑡𝑡

Here, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the CAR experienced by firm i over the relevant event window. To address
potential outliers, the CARs are Winsorized at 5%.

We then use a straightforward ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to test how
these CARs vary with industry, ownership structure, and other firm characteristics. This
regression specification can be represented as follows:
𝑘𝑘

(13)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + � 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘+1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘+2 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘+3 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗=1

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the CAR computed for firm i around the event date, as described above, and 𝛼𝛼 is

a constant. For each of k different industries, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable that is equal to

one if firm i belongs to industry j, and is zero otherwise. For instance, we focus on

specific industries of interest, such as banking and real estate. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is an indicator

variable equal to one for firms classified by Prowess as state-owned. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is an
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indicator variable equal to one for firms classified by Prowess as belonging to a business
group. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to one for firms classified by Prowess as being
foreign-owned. 𝐗𝐗 𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables (in the reported results, these are total
assets, profits, advertising expenditures, and marketing expenses for fiscal year 2016),

and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 is the error term.

Table 1 reports summary statistics for the CARs for each of the event windows, as

well as for the other variables used in the regression analysis. 47 The overall market
reaction around the demonetization announcement is negative, with the return on the
BSE200 index (our measure of the market return) being about -1.5% on the event date.
This is reflected in the average CARs reported in Table 1, which are negative across all
event windows, and as large as -5% over the (-3, +3) window. However, it is difficult to
reach any firm conclusions on this basis, because of the potential confounding events
such as the US Presidential election.

5) Results and Discussion
5.1) Basic Results
Table 2 presents the mean CAR for firms in each of three particularly noteworthy
sectors, using the (-1, +1) window. Standard errors are computed by regressing the CARs
for the firms in each category on a constant. Note, however, that inferences using
bootstrapped standard errors are very similar to those using the conventional standard
errors reported in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, the CARs experienced by firms in the
real estate sector was around -3%, and is statistically significant. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that the real estate sector would be negatively impacted as it serves as a
repository for unaccounted-for cash. However, the magnitude of this effect is relatively
modest; it is closer to the first of the two stylized scenarios described in Section 3.1 (see
Equation (8)), where the fraction of real estate prices paid in the form of unaccounted-for
cash is quite small. Alternatively, it may be the case that tax evasion is widespread, while
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Note that the number of firms for which we are able to compute CARs varies slightly across the different
windows. This is because, for instance, a firm may have missing price data on the +1 day, making it
impossible to compute the (-1, +1) CAR, while it has price data on days +2 and +3, enabling the
computation of CARs for the longer windows.
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the modest market reaction reflects an expectation that demonetization would have little
impact on the prevalence of tax evasion.
However, we wish to highlight some important caveats. First, our results are only
for publicly traded firms, and there are of course many real estate firms that are not
publicly traded. Moreover, the publicly traded firms must disclose to the market more
than private firms and hence may tend to be more transparent. Second, the real estate
market may be subject to offsetting effects. For example, if banks received a large longterm infusion of funds then one of the markets in which they may disburse those funds is
the home mortgage market (given its high growth rate in recent years (Khanna, 2017)),
which would then have a positive effect on the real estate sector. Further, to the extent
that people believe unaccounted-for cash will be less prevalent in real estate going
forward then perhaps additional foreign investment might come into real estate and that
could have an offsetting effect. 48
Generally consistent with this result for the real estate sector is the absence of any
detectable relationship between the CARs we compute and the Transparency
International index of sector-level corruption. As there are only a limited number of
values that this index takes on, Figure 1 shows a scatterplot that represents the mean CAR
for each value of the index. It also shows a line of best fit, computed using all of the
CARs (as opposed to just the mean CARs for each index value). This line is essentially
horizontal. Indeed, if anything there is a slight positive slope, indicating slightly larger
effects for less corrupt industries (the opposite of what might be expected).
Regressing the CARs on the corruption index yields coefficients that are small in
magnitude and that are not robustly significant across specifications. In general, the
estimated coefficients are positive in sign, suggesting that CARs are larger for industries
where corruption is less prevalent. It is possible that the small and statistically
insignificant average effect masks heterogeneity among firms within the same industry.
For instance, it may be that larger and better-connected firms benefit from corruption
(and would experience negative returns from the announcement), while smaller and less
connected firms in the same industry suffer a competitive disadvantage due to their
48

Alex Frew McMillan “2017 is Going to be a Good Year for India’s Property Market”, Forbes, December
21, 2016, available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexfrewmcmillan/2016/12/21/2017-is-going-to-be-agood-year-for-indias-property-market/#578f97103409.
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competitors corrupt behavior (and so would experience positive returns from the
announcement). To test for this possibility, we interact the corruption index with a
measure of size (total assets). The interaction term, however, is generally statistically
insignificant, suggesting that the effects of industry-level corruption on firms’ CARs are
not mediated by firm size to any detectable degree.
Overall, these findings suggest that the market expected the effects of
demonetization on corruption and tax evasion across the economy to be modest at best. In
contrast, the results for banks and SOEs are rather more striking. Table 2 shows that the
mean CAR for firms in the banking sector is positive and statistically significant at the
1% level. This effect (of around 3%) seems to indicate that investors expected the
banking sector to benefit from demonetization, despite the various arguments discussed
in Section 3 for why any impact on bank profits may be limited. Our third result relates to
SOEs, which had a mean CAR that is both positive and significant at the 1% level. This
effect (of around 2%) is consistent with our hypothesis that SOEs may be impacted
differently than other types of firms. We explore potential explanations for this in our
discussion below.
As noted earlier, it is possible that firms that sell products directly to consumers
(in situations where cash transactions are likely to predominate) may have experienced
negative reactions - unrelated to corruption or tax evasion - based on disruption to their
sales. There is no direct measure of this characteristic, so we use advertising and
marketing expenses as proxies for the extent to which firms are “consumer-facing.” In
particular, we compute the ratio of advertising expense to total assets, and define firms as
highly consumer-facing if this ratio exceeds the mean (where the mean is computed for
the subsample of firms that report strictly positive advertising expense). An analogous
variable is defined for marketing expenses. Table 2 shows that firms that are defined in
this way as “consumer-facing” experienced a statistically significant -2% abnormal
return, providing some evidence of an effect on consumer transactions. In the regression
analysis, an indicator variable for these “consumer-facing” firms is also generally
negative, but is not statistically significant across all event windows. Note, however, that
the regression analysis described below controls for advertising and marketing expenses,
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so that the results we obtain take account of any effect of demonetization on consumers’
cash transactions.
5.2) Portfolio Analysis
As all firms experienced the Prime Ministerial announcement on the same day, a
potential problem for inference is the possibility of cross-correlation of returns across
firms within the same sector on the event dates. One approach to addressing this potential
problem is to aggregate the firms within a given sector into a single portfolio and to
estimate the portfolio CARs around the event date (e.g. Kothari and Warner, 2007). This
procedure renders moot any cross-correlation among the returns of firms within sectors.
We thus aggregate all the banks in our sample into a single bank portfolio. Figure 2
shows the abnormal returns for this bank portfolio within the (-3, +3) window and for the
subsequent period up to March 31, 2017 (the last trading day for which we have Prowess
daily stock price data). There is a large positive abnormal return of over 4% on
November 10 that is statistically significant (the test statistic is 2.6). This is followed by
positive portfolio returns on the subsequent two days that are smaller in magnitude,
although not statistically significant.
A quite similar pattern exists for a portfolio consisting of all SOEs in our sample,
as shown in Figure 3. There is a large positive abnormal return of about 2.6% on
November 10 that is statistically significant (the test statistic is 2.1). This is followed by
positive portfolio returns on the subsequent two days that are smaller in magnitude and
are not statistically significant.
Recall that the bank and SOE reactions to the demonetization event are puzzling
in some respects, and that (as discussed above) it is possible that stock market investors
were mistaken in their initial reactions. If so, we would expect the initial reaction to
reverse over time. The relatively long post-event period - of about five months, up to
March 31, 2017 – for which daily stock price data is available in Prowess provides an
opportunity to test for such a reversal.
For both the banking and SOE portfolios, the reactions around the demonetization
event are quite exceptional, in that their magnitude is larger than the reaction on any day
subsequent to the event window. Moreover, reactions on days after the event window are
generally not statistically significant. If we leave statistical significance to one side, and
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sum the bank portfolio returns shown in Figure 2, there is some evidence of reversal but
it is not of sufficient magnitude to offset the initial positive reaction within the event
window. The reaction around the event for the bank portfolio is about 4.5% to 6%
(depending on the event window). The sum of the post-event window returns (up to
March 31, 2017) is -1.6%. Even if we ignore the latter’s lack of statistical significance,
the net effect (of about 3% to 4.5%) remains positive and quite substantial in magnitude.
The conclusions are quite similar for the SOE portfolio. The reaction around the
event for the SOE portfolio is about 2% to 2.5% (depending on the event window). The
sum of the post-event window returns (up to March 31, 2017) is about -1%. Even if we
ignore the latter’s lack of statistical significance, the net effect (of about 1% to 1.5%)
remains positive. Thus, there is at most some limited evidence of partial reversal in
market reactions for the bank and SOE portfolios. Overall, both banks and SOEs
experienced positive returns around the demonetization announcement, and any
subsequent reversal was too small in magnitude to offset these initial reactions. Thus, it
appears that stock market investors did not fundamentally reconsider their initial
expectations about the consequences of demonetization for banks and SOEs (at least
during the subsequent 5-month period).
5.3) Regression Results
Table 3 reports the results of the regression specification shown in Equation (13),
for all three of the event windows. The regressions include various industry and
ownership dummies. The final column of Table 3 adds in the financial statement
variables in the vector X as controls. Table 3 reports robust standard errors, but the
results are very similar when standard errors are clustered at the industry level (by 5-digit
NIC code).
The strong results for banks and SOEs are robust to using this regression
specification, and indeed are somewhat larger in magnitude. The effect for banks varies
from about 4% to 7%, depending on the specification, and is statistically significant
across all specifications. The effect for SOEs varies from about 2% to 6%, depending on
the specification, and is statistically significant across all specifications.
The effect for real estate is negative (as in Table 2). It varies in magnitude from
about -2% to -4%, depending on the specification, and is statistically significant across all
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specifications. Differential effects for foreign-owned and business group firms are small
in magnitude and generally insignificant. There is also no other industry that experiences
market reactions that are consistently significant across the event windows, and the
magnitudes are generally small. The one exception is the pharmaceutical and health
sector, for which the effect varies from about 1% to 2%, depending on the specification,
and is statistically significant across all specifications. We discuss this below in the
context of the results relating to industries’ external financial dependence.
As the US presidential election of November 8, 2016 has the potential to
confound these effects (as discussed earlier in the Introduction), it is noteworthy that the
information technology sector – which has close ties to the US and is potentially
vulnerable to US trade and immigration policies – experiences only small (and
statistically insignificant) market reactions. This reinforces our earlier point that it is
unlikely that the US election would have a substantial impact in India at the industry
level, even though it may well have affected the general level of the Indian market around
this time.
It is possible that firms that are more “foreign-facing” are less prone to corruption
due to the influence of externals norms and laws. To test for this, we construct an
indicator for firms that report strictly positive revenue from exports. Adding this variable
to the regressions shown in Table 3 yields coefficients that are not robustly significant
across specifications. In addition, including a control variable in these regressions for the
ratio of exports to total sales (treating missing values of exports as zeroes) does not
change the basic results.
A different way to characterize foreign-facing firms is to focus on those that are
cross-listed in foreign markets. We use the list of cross-listed Indian firms constructed by
Dharmapala and Khanna (2013b) based on the Bank of New York Mellon dataset of
worldwide cross-listings. 49 This dataset allows us to classify cross-listed firms by the
type of cross-listing – specifically, into those that undertook non-US cross-listings
(mostly in Luxembourg), those that issued shares to US investors through private
placements or Rule 144A offerings (without becoming subject to US securities law), and
those that listed on a US exchange. The last of these categories (higher-level cross49

For more details, see Dharmapala and Khanna (2013b).
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listings) is subject to US securities law, and most likely also to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) which may provide a strong deterrent to the firm, for instance,
against bribing officials in India.
Adding an indicator for non-US cross-listings to the regressions in Table 3 yields
coefficients that are small and statistically insignificant. There is thus no evidence that
these firms experienced market reactions that differed from the market as a whole. An
indicator for lower-level US cross-listings is positive in sign but not robustly significant
across specifications. An indicator for higher-level US cross-listings is positive, large in
magnitude, and statistically significant. However, there are only a handful of firms in this
category, so it is difficult to reach firm conclusions.
5.4) The Banking Sector and Financial Constraints
It appears that investors anticipated at the time of demonetization that the profits
of banks would be positively affected. This entails an expectation that demonetization
would result in a persistent (rather than transitory) increase in financial sector deposits.
Indeed, the observed reaction requires that the market believed that demonetization
would lead to a substantial and persistent shift in the form of savings by the public in
India, specifically from unaccounted-for cash to bank deposits. Of course, the
announcement was expected to lead (as it in fact did) to a massive inflow of new deposits
at banks. However, to explain a substantial increase in the value of banks’ equity, it is
necessary that these deposits were expected to not be withdrawn (or otherwise used for
consumption, for instance through electronic payments) in the short-to-medium term.
This scenario would enable banks to increase lending or other profitable activities.
One approach to exploring the banking sector result further is to look at the
industries that would be most likely to receive some of the incremental investible funds
that investors seem to have expected banks to receive as a result of demonetization. To do
so, we use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external financial dependence
(updated by Kroszner et al. (2007), as described in Section 4). Figure 4 presents a
scatterplot of the results. As there are only a limited number of values that the external
dependence measure takes on, Figure 4 shows a scatterplot that represents the mean CAR
for each value of the index. It also shows a line of best fit, computed using all of the
CARs (as opposed to just the mean CARs for each index value). This line is clearly

30

positive in slope. This is consistent with the notion that firms in industries with higher
external finance dependence scores were thought by the market to benefit more from
demonetization than firms from industries with lower scores.
Table 4 reports regressions of the CARs on the external dependence measure. We
control for an industry’s corruption perception according to Transparency International
(2011), and in Column 4 we control for the same set of financial statement variables as in
Table 3. The table reports robust standard errors that are clustered at the industry level
(by 5-digit NIC code). We find a positive and statistically significant relationship across
all event windows. A 1-unit increase in ED (e.g. from the level of “food products” to that
of “plastic products”) is associated with a higher abnormal return around the event of
between 0.5 percentage points and 1 percentage point, depending on the event window.
This magnitude entails that a one standard deviation increase in the external dependence
measure is associated with a higher CAR around the event of between about 0.4
percentage points and about 0.7 percentage points (e.g. if the counterfactual return were 1%, then the firm would experience a return of between -0.6% and -0.3% as a result of
having external dependence that is one standard deviation higher).
This result when taken together with the result for the banking sector suggests that
when banks obtain more funds the market expects that these funds will be disbursed to
firms in those industries that are more dependent on external finance. As further evidence
consistent with this account we note that the pharmaceutical industry is the one industry
(outside of banking) to show a consistently positive and significant result (see Table 3).
The pharmaceutical industry is the most dependent on external finance, according to the
Rajan-Zingales measure. We thus treat this evidence as consistent with the account that
the increase in deposits is perceived by the market to profit banks and benefits those
sectors that are the most likely to seek bank finance.
Assessing whether this apparent market expectation was reasonable is quite
complicated. At a fundamental conceptual level, it is unclear why demonetization
(followed by remonetization) would by itself affect households’ demand for cash and
cash equivalents. More specifically, one of the key conditions required to explain the
result is that individuals did not withdraw their deposited amounts quickly or at least left
them in the banks long enough that banks would have sufficient time to invest these

31

funds and earn returns to justify the large CARs. The magnitude of the market reaction
cannot be readily explained without assuming that the market expected a fairly persistent
increase in bank deposits and financial depth. 50
In the first few weeks after the announcement it appears that deposits outpaced
withdrawals by around a ratio of 4 to 1. 51 One simple explanation for this is that the
government had limited the withdrawal amounts since demonetization was announced to
levels that are substantially below those for deposits. This naturally creates an imbalance.
However, even as the limits on withdrawals were gradually lifted (a process that was
completed by March 13, 2017) it does not appear that withdrawals have increased
dramatically. One explanation for this is that following shortly after the demonetization
announcement, the government made various changes to the law that might have
enhanced the visibility of moves to withdraw large amounts of money and appear to be
using those laws to target their tax evasion enforcement efforts. These steps might also
make people more concerned about withdrawing large amounts. 52 Further, some of the
schemes the government provided between November 9, 2016 and December 30, 2016
(such as the Taxation and Investment Regime for Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana)
allow depositors to retain more of their deposits value if they leave it untouched with the
bank for some time – thereby limiting withdrawals as well. It is, however, possible that
withdrawals rates will begin to pick up over time. On the other hand, it is also possible
50
The aggregate market capitalization of the banks in our sample at the end of the estimation window (i.e.
on November 3, 2016) was about INR 13.5 trillion. A market reaction of about 5% (within the range that
we estimate) thus implies an increase in (after-tax) value of about INR 0.7 trillion; in turn (assuming a 35%
corporate income tax rate), this requires a pretax increase in value of INR 1.1 trillion. World Bank data
(available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.LNDP?end=2016&start=1960) suggests a global
average interest rate spread between deposits and loans of about 6% (although the figure for India is
missing). Using this 6% spread, it would be necessary for loanable deposits to increase by nearly INR 20
trillion for one year in order to generate an additional return of INR 1.1 trillion (note, however, that this
does not take into account the fees that may be earned by banks on deposits or other transactions, even if
these are subsequently withdrawn quickly). This amount significantly exceeds the INR 15 trillion amount
that was deposited following demonetization (see e.g. “97% of scrapped notes deposited with banks as on
Dec 30: Report”, Times of India, January 5, 2017, available at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-features/business/97-of-scrapped-notes-deposited-with-banks-as-ondec-30-report/articleshow/56344692.cms).
51
Sunny Verma, “Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojana: Post ‘last chance’ IDS, comes a new
declaration scheme”, Indian Express, November 29, 2016. Available at:
http://indianexpress.com/article/business/business-others/pradhan-mantri-garib-kalyan-yojana-ids-scheme4400491/.
52
It also appears that from April 1, 2017 cash transactions in excess of INR 200,000 are prohibited. “Cash
transaction limit slashed to Rs. 2 lakh”, The Hindu, March 22, 2017. Available at:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cash-transaction-limit-slashed-to-rs-2-lakh/article17561911.ece.
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that people may increasingly prefer to be in the formal sector and get the advantages that
it increasingly offers (e.g., e-payments). 53 Which of these future behavioral patterns is
more likely is difficult to conclusively determine at this time, although early evidence
suggests withdrawals may have declined. 54
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) changed the incremental reserve ratio for banks
to prevent an increase in lending out of the new deposits. Such a measure would, had it
persisted, have affected the ability of banks to generate profits from the new deposits.
However, this measure was short-lived. It was announced on November 26, 2016 as a
temporary measure that would be revisited or expire on or before December 09,
2016. On December 07, 2016 the RBI announced that the November 26 measure would
be removed with effect from December 10, 2016. 55
For our purposes the key issue is whether the market reaction around November
8, 2016 for the banking sector is plausible given the potential for withdrawals following
deposits. We think the market is likely to have thought that individuals depositing large
amounts of money may not try to immediately withdraw those funds both because there
were limits on withdrawals, but also because it might invite unwanted scrutiny for a
variety of reasons. Although some of the enhanced scrutiny methods came shortly after
the event window (suggesting that the market may not have known of them), these
methods were probably in a class of steps one might anticipate a government would take
53

See e.g., Prithraj Panigrahi, “Bank Deposit Growth Continues even as Restriction on Cash Withdrawals
are Removed”, CEIC Blog, May 26, 2017. Available at: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/blog/india-banksliquidity. “Cash withdrawal from banks falling at faster pace after demonetization”, News Nation, April 04,
2017, available at: http://www.newsnation.in/business-news/economy/cash-withdrawal-from-banks-fallingat-faster-pace-after-demonetisation-article-167128.html.
It is also an interesting, albeit open, question what people who had deposited unaccounted for
money would do after it was deposited. These individuals would have paid some money to effect the
deposit – either to intermediaries for evading the higher taxes or to the government in the form of taxes and
penalties. However, once that occurs and the fees/penalties have been paid what is the advantage of taking
the money out of your account to push back into “black” money? If one wanted to use the cash for
corruption payments and so forth then it would presumably be better to do that with cash than directly from
bank account payments. However, taking out large amounts of cash is bound to attract law enforcement
attention, thus increasing the risk of being caught or the risk of having to pay additional bribes to prevent
additional law enforcement scrutiny. At the margin the value of keeping cash should have reduced
somewhat (though how much is hard to tell this early on).
54
Ibid., and “RBI need not print entire amount of extinguished currency: Report”, Money Control, March
31, 2017. Available at:
http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/economy/rbi-need-not-print-entire-amount-of-extinguishedcurrency-report-2250553.html.
55
See RBI Circular, DBR.No.Ret.BC.41/12.01.001/2016-17, November 26, 2016 imposing limit and RBI
Circular, DBR.No.Ret.BC.46/12.01.001/2016-17, December 7, 2016 removing limit.
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after taking a huge political risk like demonetization of the scale adopted in India.
Moreover, some of the unattractiveness of taking large withdrawals from bank accounts
were present before demonetization too (e.g., the PMLA). In light of this, it appears
reasonable to think that the market expected a good portion of the deposits would not be
withdrawn in the short to medium term. 56
5.5) Explaining the SOE Result
To probe the SOE result further, we note that many of India’s banks are SOEs and
perhaps the bank SOEs are driving the overall SOE result. In Table 5, we examine this
question. Column (1) confirms the results we have obtained in Table 3 that banks and
SOEs each experience positive and statistically significant CARs. We add here an
interaction term between banks and SOEs. This shows that the positive reaction for SOE
banks is significantly larger than that for nonbank SOEs; nonetheless, nonbank SOEs also
experience statistically significant (albeit smaller) positive returns, suggesting that the
bank SOEs are not driving the overall SOE result. Column (2) excludes all SOEs and
finds a positive and significant result of around 6% for non-SOE banks. This indicates
that the banking sector effect applies to non-SOE banks (as well as to SOE banks).
Column (3) includes only SOEs and finds that the bank dummy is positive and significant
with an even larger coefficient (of around 10%). Finally, Column (4) excludes banks and
finds that the SOE dummy is still significant and positive at around 4%. This reinforces
the idea that it is not the bank SOEs that are driving the overall SOE results.
To explore this further, we examine the market reaction in relation to the
corruption index for the sample of non-bank SOEs. Although this restricts the sample size
to 47, the result (presented visually in Figure 5) is intriguing. Here we see that the lower
the corruption score (i.e., the more corrupt the industry) the stronger the effect. In other
words, SOEs in industries that are thought to be more corrupt appear to have a larger
CARs, consistent with the notion that demonetization appears to have increased the value
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Consistent with this expectation are news reports suggesting that a large bank, the State Bank of India,
was faced with the challenge of finding suitable investment opportunities for the extra deposits it received –
see Vishwanath Nair “Demonetisation Leaves State Bank of India Scrambling To Deploy Surplus
Deposits” BloombergQuint, May 23, 2017, available at:
https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/2017/05/23/demonetisation-leaves-state-bank-of-indiascrambling-to-deploy-surplus-deposits.
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of SOEs, particularly in corrupt industries. Although the relationship in Figure 5 is not
statistically significant (perhaps due to the small sample size), the pattern is intriguing.
The SOE results are consistently positive and significant but are somewhat
difficult to explain. One explanation is that the increase in deposits at banks, many of
which are state owned, might lead to more funds being available for SOEs. While we
cannot exclude this account, we think it is not very likely. Few SOEs are considered very
profitable and so SOEs are unlikely to be particularly appealing as borrowers from the
perspective of non-state owned banks. Of course, this does not preclude SOE banks from
engaging in such financing of SOEs for non-profit driven reasons. However, if bank
SOEs were likely to provide capital to poorly performing SOEs, then we would expect to
see that the market would respond with a larger positive reaction for private banks than
for SOE banks. Table 5 shows that the market responded in the opposite manner – SOE
banks experienced an even larger positive reaction than private banks. For these reasons,
we are skeptical that access to the incremental bank deposits is what explains this result.
Second, it is conceivable that if the Government obtains an increase in tax
collections then that might inure to the benefit of SOEs by providing them with more
capital. There is some evidence of an increase in at least municipal tax collections since
demonetization. 57 However, this does not explain why non-bank SOEs in more corrupt
industries seem to have a more positive reaction than those in less corrupt industries
(though this result is not significant).
We think a third explanation may be worth examining – that the potential
corruption reducing effects of demonetization might be showing up in results on SOEs.
This builds on the notion that one of the key reasons why some industries are considered
more prone to corruption than others is interaction with the government through
regulation or other mechanisms. If interaction with the government can be a proxy for
corruption risk, then being owned by the government might similarly be a proxy for
corruption risk. If this is correct then if demonetization is perceived by the market to
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See Moushumi Das Gupta “Demonetisation windfall: Civic agencies record 268% increase in tax
collection” Hindustan Times, November 23, 2016, available at:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/demonetization-windfall-civic-agencies-record-268-increasein-tax-collection/story-O3YsryY0WtdefZy8vdBMFM.html
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reduce corruption (directly or indirectly) then we would expect to see an increase in
CARs for SOEs.
If this SOE result is the result of reduced perceptions of corruption then that raises
questions about why that might be. One explanation is that SOEs are – for reasons just
discussed – more likely to suffer from corruption and hence more likely to benefit from
any perceived reductions in corruption. Moreover, it is possible that the extent to which
SOEs are susceptible to corruption, relative to non-SOEs, is much greater than the
differences in corruption among non-SOEs that the Transparency International and other
indices seek to capture. This can potentially explain a large effect for SOEs, even though
there is little evidence that market reactions to demonetization were related to the
prevalence of corruption in different industries.
In addition, when the government decided to act in an unprecedented manner that
carried great political and economic risk, it may have sent a (quite costly) signal about its
seriousness in curtailing corruption. Much scholarly discussion of corruption envisages it
as an equilibrium in which expectations are self-fulfilling. The government taking this
large and potentially very risky step is likely to make people reconsider their expectations
and perhaps move the equilibrium. It may be that the if demonetization is treated as a
signal of future anti-corruption efforts then perhaps the place where the government may
first tackle these issues is in SOEs as the government is most able to influence their
behavior. Broadly speaking, the marginal productivity of the government’s greater
likelihood of policing corruption is likely to be highest where there is the most corruption
and where the government has the greatest ability to influence it – the SOE sector.
In addition to the intrinsic interest in this finding it also raises the prospect –
which is to the best of our knowledge not pursued in depth in the corruption literature –
that the ownership of firms may also serve as a proxy for corruption risk along with
industry. SOEs may proxy for interaction with the state as does industry. Further, foreign
ownership (due to their home country standards) and business groups (due to opacity)
may also serve as useful indicia of corruption risk (although they do not experience
consistently different returns in the context that we study). We think this may prove to be
an intriguing additional measure of corruption risk to those that already exist in the
literature. However, we leave further inquiry for future research.
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6) Conclusion
India’s November 8, 2016 demonetization was perhaps one of the most dramatic
moves a government has made in the name of reducing corruption and tax evasion.
Although a full assessment of the effects of demonetization is surely many years away,
stock market reactions around the announcement date provide a window into investors’
expectations about the longer-term impact of demonetization on different sectors of the
economy and on different types of firms. They also potentially provide insights into the
phenomena of corruption and tax evasion, and the channels through which tools to
address them may operate.
We compute abnormal returns for firms on the Indian stock market around this
event, and compare patterns of abnormal returns for different subsamples of firms
defined by industry, ownership structure, and other characteristics. We find little
evidence that sectors thought to be associated with greater tax evasion or corruption
experienced significantly different returns. However, we find substantial positive returns
for banks and for SOEs. The effect for banks appears to indicate a market expectation of
a persistent increase in the form of savings from unaccounted-for cash to bank deposits –
i.e. an increase in financial depth. This is reinforced by a pattern of higher returns for
industries that are characterized by a greater dependence on external finance, which
possibly reflects an expectation of an easing of financial constraints. The returns for
SOEs may be due to possible indirect effects of the announcement on perceptions of
future corruption among these firms. This effect highlights the need for further inquiry
into how SOE status affects perceptions of corruption.
As was highlighted earlier, there are many important caveats regarding inferences
from stock market reactions. Most importantly, there is no guarantee that investors’
expectations will turn out to be correct, especially for such an unprecedented event.
Nonetheless, stock market reactions represent a valuable “first rough draft” of the effects,
given investors’ knowledge and financial incentives to predict these effects correctly.
It is also important to bear in mind that these stock market reactions do not tell us
whether demonetization was an economic and development success or failure. There are
many complex benefits and costs – such as the extensive economic disruption – that
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would have to be taken into account to make an overall assessment. The stock market
reactions that we study provide only a partial picture, but these types of effects are an
important element of any overall evaluation.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
CARs:
(-1, +1) Window
(-2, +2) Window
(-3, +3) Window
Ownership Variables:
SOE = 1
Business Group = 1
Foreign-owned = 1
Financial Statement Variables:
Total Assets
Profits
Advertising Expenditures
Marketing Expenditures

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Number of
Observations

-0.01387
-0.0146
-0.0508

0.0464
0.0626
0.0872

2919
2991
3029

0.0337
0.3593
0.0340

0.1804
0.4799
0.1812

3415
3415
3415

123177.3
11653.55
93.33
189.33

904798.9
73767.38
936.5891
1729.675

1661
1661
3415
3415

Other Variables:
Corruption Index
6.699
0.5023
2125
External Dependence
0.1805
0.7321
1516
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the demonetization event are
computed using the market model, and are Winsorized at 5%. The ownership variables
for State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), business group firms and foreign-owned firms are
indicator variables from Prowess. Financial statement variables are also from Prowess,
and are reported in millions of INR. Missing values for advertising and marketing
expenditures are treated as zeroes. The corruption index is from Transparency
International (2011). The external dependence measure captures industry-level
dependence on external finance, and is from Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiehl (2007),
representing an updated version of the measure constructed in Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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Table 2: CARs for Selected Sectors and Subgroups of Firms around November 9,
2016
Sector or Subgroup
of Firms

Window
(-1, +1)

Market Reaction
Mean CAR
(Standard error)
(Number of firms)

Real Estate

November 8 – November 10, 2016

-0.0326***
(0.0050)
(104)

Banking

November 8 – November 10, 2016

0.0305***
(0.0059)
(64)

State-Owned Firms

November 8 – November 10, 2016

0.0181***
(0.0044)
(89)

Consumer-facing
November 8 – November 10, 2016
-0.0201***
Firms (high ratio of
(0.0036)
advertising expenses
(133)
to assets)
Consumer-facing
November 8 – November 10, 2016
-0.0163***
Firms (high ratio of
(0.0022)
marketing expenses
(335)
to assets)
Note: This table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the
demonetization event. CARs are computed using the market model, and are Winsorized
at 5%. The event window is a [-1, +1] window around the November 8, 2016
announcement of demonetization. In the fourth row, “consumer-facing” firms are defined
as those with a ratio of advertising expenses to assets that exceeds the mean (among those
firms that report strictly positive levels of advertising expenses). In the fifth row,
“consumer-facing” firms are defined as those with a ratio of marketing expenses to assets
that exceeds the mean (among those firms that report strictly positive levels of marketing
expenses) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Stock Market Reactions around November 9, 2016, by Industry and
Ownership
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Event
Event
Event
Event
Window:
Window:
Window:
Window:
(-1, +1)
(-2, +2)
(-3, +3)
(-3, +3)
Dependent Variable: CAR around Nov. 8, 2016
Banks = 1
Real Estate = 1
Mining = 1
Electricity = 1
Pharmaceuticals
and Health = 1
Telecommunications
=1
Information
Technology = 1
State-Owned = 1
Foreign-Owned = 1
Business Group = 1
Controls for Total
Assets, Profits,
Advertising, and
Marketing?
Constant

Observations
R-squared

0.03856***
(0.006)
-0.01779***
(0.005)
-0.00534
(0.009)
0.00757*
(0.004)
0.01252***
(0.003)
0.01075
(0.011)
-0.00238
(0.004)
0.02400***
(0.004)
-0.00426
(0.004)
-0.00160
(0.002)

0.05260***
(0.007)
-0.02647***
(0.006)
-0.00789
(0.012)
0.00496
(0.009)
0.01599***
(0.005)
0.00279
(0.013)
-0.00012
(0.005)
0.03256***
(0.005)
-0.00208
(0.005)
-0.00117
(0.002)

0.07225***
(0.010)
-0.03133***
(0.009)
-0.02379
(0.017)
0.01661
(0.013)
0.01563**
(0.007)
0.01021
(0.020)
0.00785
(0.007)
0.04389***
(0.008)
-0.00142
(0.008)
-0.00786**
(0.003)

0.05094***
(0.016)
-0.04543***
(0.010)
-0.02384
(0.019)
0.01240
(0.015)
0.02394***
(0.008)
0.01821
(0.031)
0.00657
(0.009)
0.05722***
(0.010)
0.01136
(0.009)
0.00674
(0.005)

No

No

No

Yes

-0.01459***
(0.001)

-0.01599***
(0.002)

-0.05083***
(0.002)

-0.06368***
(0.004)

2,895
0.039

2,965
0.039

3,003
0.038

1,355
0.077

Note: This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR) for various event windows - [-1, +1], [-2, +2], and [-3, +3] - around the November
8, 2016 announcement of demonetization. Industry dummies are constructed using the 5-digit
National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes reported in the Prowess database. Ownership type
and controls for total assets, profits, advertising, and marketing are all from the Prowess database;
missing values of advertising and marketing expenditures are set to zero. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses.

*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Stock Market Reactions and External Financial Dependence
(1)
Event
Window:
(-1, +1)

(2)
Event
Window:
(-2, +2)

(3)
Event
Window:
(-3, +3)

(4)
Event
Window:
(-3, +3)

Dependent Variable: CAR around Nov. 8, 2016
External Dependence
Corruption Index

Controls for Ownership
Type, Total Assets,
Profits, Advertising,
and Marketing?
Constant

0.00535***
(0.001)
-0.00238
(0.005)

0.00807***
(0.002)
-0.00724
(0.007)

0.01047***
(0.004)
-0.00509
(0.011)

0.01258**
(0.005)
0.00324
(0.012)

No

No

No

Yes

0.00084
(0.035)

0.03104
(0.047)

-0.02789
(0.075)

-0.09337
(0.078)

Observations
1,202
1,220
1,228
516
R-squared
0.012
0.017
0.012
0.086
Note: This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) for various event windows - [-1, +1], [-2, +2], and [-3, +3] around the November 8, 2016 announcement of demonetization. The external
dependence measure is from Kroszner et al. (2007), and represents an updated version of
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure. The external dependence measure is constructed
by International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code for manufacturing
industries. The ISIC codes are matched to the 5-digit National Industrial Classification
(NIC) codes in Prowess using the concordance in Sivadasan (2009). The corruption index
is from Transparency International. Ownership type (state-owned, foreign-owned and
business group) and controls for total assets, profits, advertising, and marketing are all
from the Prowess database; missing values of advertising and marketing expenditures are
set to zero. Robust standard errors clustered at 5-digit National Industrial Classification
(NIC) level are reported in parentheses.
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Stock Market Reactions for Banks and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
(1)
All Firms

(2)
Excluding
SOEs

(3)
SOEs

(4)
Excluding
Banks

Dependent Variable: CAR around Nov. 8, 2016
Event Window: (-3, +3)
Banks = 1

0.06169***
(0.012)

State-Owned = 1

0.04069***
(0.009)

Banks*State-Owned

0.04015**
(0.017)

Constant

-0.05367***
(0.002)

0.06169***
(0.012)

0.10183***
(0.012)
0.04069***
(0.009)

-0.05367***
(0.002)

-0.01297
(0.009)

-0.05367***
(0.002)

Observations
3,003
2,914
89
2,937
R-squared
0.029
0.008
0.286
0.005
Note: This table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR) for a [-3, +3] event window around the November 8, 2016
announcement of demonetization. Industry dummies are constructed using the 5-digit
National Industrial Classification (NIC) codes reported in the Prowess database.
Ownership type is from the Prowess database. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
*: significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 1: Stock Market Reactions and the Transparency International Measure of
Corruption by Sector
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Note: This graph shows a scatterplot representing the mean CAR for each value of the
Transparency International (2011) measure of corruption by sector. Higher values of this
corruption index indicate lower levels of perceived corruption. Only the mean CAR is
shown, as there are only a limited number of values taken by the index. The line of best
fit is, however, computed using all of the CARs (as opposed to just the mean CARs for
each index value). CARs are computed using the market model, and are Winsorized at
5%.
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Figure 2: Abnormal Returns for the Portfolio of Banks
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Note: This figure shows the abnormal returns within the (-3, +3) event window and the
subsequent period up to March 31, 2017, for a portfolio consisting of all the banks in our
sample.
Figure 3: Abnormal Returns for the Portfolio of State-Owned Firms (SOEs)
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Note: This figure shows the abnormal returns within the (-3, +3) event window and the
subsequent period up to March 31, 2017, for a portfolio consisting of all the SOEs in our
sample.
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Figure 4: Stock Market Reactions and External Financial Dependence by Sector
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Note: This graph shows a scatterplot representing the mean CAR for each value of the
external financial dependence measure from Kroszner et al. (2007), which represents an
updated version of the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure. The external dependence
measure is constructed by International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code for
manufacturing industries. The ISIC codes are matched to the 5-digit National Industrial
Classification (NIC) codes in Prowess using the concordance in Sivadasan (2009). Only
the mean CAR is shown, as there are only a limited number of values taken by the index.
The line of best fit is, however, computed using all of the CARs (as opposed to just the
mean CARs for each index value). CARs are computed using the market model, and are
Winsorized at 5%.
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Figure 5: Stock Market Reactions and the Transparency International Measure of
Corruption for Nonbank State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
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Note: This graph shows a scatterplot representing the mean CAR for nonbank SOEs, for
each value of the Transparency International (2011) measure of corruption by sector.
Higher values of this corruption index indicate lower levels of perceived corruption. Only
the mean CAR is shown, as there are only a limited number of values taken by the index.
The line of best fit is, however, computed using all of the CARs (as opposed to just the
mean CARs for each index value). CARs are computed using the market model, and are
Winsorized at 5%.
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